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Abstract:  
Traditional creative destruction theories distinguish disruptions as competence-destroying or 
competence-enhancing to incumbents’ capabilities, with the former case resulting in incumbents’ 
loss of competitive advantage in in-house R&D performance (even if complementary assets aid in 
retaining final market share). In this paper, I propose that attention to the extent of competence 
destruction is necessary but not sufficient for analyses of competitive advantage in R&D through a 
technological discontinuity. A full analysis requires the comparison of the value added and ease of 
access (i.e., strategic value) of all capabilities, old and new. In other words, an analysis of 
competition during a transition requires assessment not only of how many of the old capabilities 
were lost but also what it takes to acquire the new ones. I find evidence for this proposition in 
qualitative and quantitative data from the transition of anti-cancer drug discovery from standard 
chemotherapy to targeted therapies. Among targeted therapies, I compare two variants, small- vs. 
large-molecule drugs, which though equally competence-destroying to chemotherapy-based drug 
discovery, differ in that large-molecule drugs require one more new capability: expertise in 
biopharmaceutical technology. By tracing the origin and evolution of biopharmaceutical 
technology, as well as its comparative value added, I can show a contrast in results: incumbents led 
in small-molecule targeted drug discovery; but they fell behind biopharmaceutical technology 
pioneers in large-molecule targeted drug discovery, where one of the new capabilities (i.e., 
expertise in biopharmaceutical technology) had higher value added and was more difficult to 
acquire than other new capabilities. 
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_________________________________________________________________________________ 
1.  Introduction 
Research on creative destruction has traditionally distinguished technological disruptions that are 
competence-enhancing from those that are competence-destroying to the capabilities
1 that incumbents had 
mastered (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  According to this classic research, when a technological 
change is competence-enhancing, the disruption will not affect the value of the capabilities already 
present within the research and development (R&D) process of incumbent firms.  Therefore, those 
capabilities will be available for re-use by incumbents during the next technological regime of the market.  
Since some of these capabilities must have exhibited an isolating mechanism (Rumelt, 1987) in order for 
their owning firms to have survived so far,
2 such as unavailable trade in the open market (Teece, 1980; 
Kogut and Zander, 1992) or the presence of time compression diseconomies in the accumulation of 
research know-how (Diericks and Cool, 1989), incumbents will retain a competitive advantage above 
entrant firms through a competence-enhancing discontinuity. 
In contrast, when a technological change is competence-destroying, the disruption obsoletes the value 
of the capabilities involved in the R&D process within the value chain of incumbents.  Incumbents will 
therefore lose their source of competitive advantage in R&D and be forced to start from scratch.  In the 
presence of organizational inertia, incumbents will incur an additional disadvantage through two main 
mechanisms: underinvestment and incompetence (Henderson, 1993).  That is, incumbents will tend to 
invest less in the new technology, and controlling for their investment will also be less productive in the 
R&D of products under the new technology, as compared to the set of firms entering the market.  
Incumbents will only retain their leadership in market share in spite of their loss in R&D productivity if 
their complementary assets retain their value and remain inaccessible to entrants (Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 
1997). 
                                                 
1 For convenience, throughout this paper I refer to resources and capabilities simply as capabilities.  I also use the 
terms “capabilities” and “competencies” interchangeably following the definitions in Amit and Schoemaker (1997). 
2 Incumbents are the leaders, evolutionarily selected from all firms that ever competed in the focal market during the 
prior technological regime.                                  4 
As can be seen, according to current theory, the key variable in the analysis of the competitive 
dynamics of R&D through a transition into a radically new technology is the degree of loss of value in 
these firms’ prior capabilities (i.e., the degree of competence destruction). 
In this paper, I argue that understanding the impact that the technological change has on the value of 
incumbents’ prior capabilities (i.e., the extent of competence destruction) is necessary but not sufficient 
for the analysis of R&D competitive dynamics through a technological discontinuity.  It is also necessary 
to understand the characteristics of the new capabilities required, in particular in terms of comparative 
value added and comparative ease of access for the different firms in competition (i.e., in terms of 
comparative strategic value [Barney, 1991]).  If incumbents lose their prior sources of competitive 
advantage in R&D, but the new capabilities are easily accessible to them, entrants should not accrue an 
advantage over incumbents.   Or if the new capabilities with the highest value added are easily acquired 
and those with the lowest value added are the only ones difficult to acquire for incumbents, then entrants’ 
competitive advantage will be slim.  Indeed, the point of interest becomes the assessment of comparative 
strategic value of the full set of capabilities (old and new) available to different groups of firms to execute 
the steps of the value chain required to generate new products in the focal market. 
In light of this proposition, and based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies, I 
present a study of the anti-cancer drug market and its transition from standard chemotherapy (i.e., 
cytotoxic drugs) into targeted therapies (i.e., targeted drugs).  This technological discontinuity is a 
consequence of the biotechnology revolution and has been characterized as competence-destroying to the 
steps of R&D termed “drug discovery” (Rang, 2006),
3 which are therefore the sole focus of this study.  
Within this competence-destroying change, I identify two separate variants of the new technology: small- 
and large-molecule targeted anti-cancer drugs.  Both variants require new capabilities in drug discovery, 
but large-molecule targeted drugs require one additional capability: biopharmaceutical technology.  By 
tracing the origin and evolution of this additional capability, I show that, in contrast to other newly 
                                                 
3 The technological change is, in contrast, competence-enhancing to the later steps of the R&D termed “clinical 
trials.”                                  5 
required capabilities, this capability was not easily accessible to incumbents.  Furthermore, recent 
research (Sosa, 2008a) has shown that in targeted anti-cancer drug discovery, in spite of the competence 
destruction of prior technological platforms mastered by incumbents, the knowledge of the indication 
(i.e., long-term oncology research), has retained significant strategic value and sustained these firms’ 
competitive advantage in R&D.  As a result, I can show the following contrast.   
In the transition from cytotoxic to small-molecule targeted drug discovery, the disruption dynamics 
were as follows: all old capabilities lost their value except for one (long-term oncology research), and 
new capabilities were easy to access.  As a result, incumbents retained leadership in their in-house R&D 
performance of small-molecule targeted drug discovery.   
In contrast, in the transition from cytotoxic to large-molecule targeted drug discovery, the disruption 
dynamics were as follows: again all old capabilities lost their value except for one (long-term oncology 
research), and new capabilities were easy to access except for one (biopharmaceutical technology).  This 
last exception led to the contrasting result.  Because biopharmaceutical technology had higher value 
added than long-term oncology research and because biopharmaceutical technology had accrued to a sub-
set of diversifying entrants (biopharmaceutical technology pioneers) and was difficult to acquire by 
follower firms, incumbents were not the absolute leaders in the in-house R&D performance of large-
molecule targeted drug discovery.  Nonetheless, incumbents fell behind only the specific group of 
entrants that were biopharmaceutical technology pioneers, still outperforming all other entrants. 
The evidence in this paper thus supports my proposition that there is a need to move attention within 
studies of R&D competition through a technological discontinuity beyond the competence destruction of 
incumbents’ old capabilities, and into the analysis of the comparative strategic value of all capabilities, 
old and new, available to the different sets of firms in competition.  The remainder of this paper advances 
as follows: section two elaborates on the theoretical proposition presented in this paper; section three 
explains the data collection, both qualitative and quantitative; section four presents the qualitative 
evidence to show that biopharmaceutical technology was a value-adding capability with restricted access 
for incumbents, and that this aspect of the capability made incumbents fall behind biopharmaceutical                                  6 
technology pioneers both in subsequent innovations in this capability and in its subsequent application in 
large-molecule anti-cancer drug discovery; section five concludes with implications for theory. 
2.  Old Competence Destruction and New Competence Access: A Dynamic Representation of the 
Resource-Based View of the Firm 
Although several interrelated taxonomies have been developed to characterize the impact of a 
technological change on a seemingly stable market, ranging from the effect on the product and 
organizational architecture (Henderson and Clark, 1990) to the industry architecture (Abernathy and 
Clark, 1985), the analysis of competitive advantage focuses largely on the distinction between 
competence enhancement and competence destruction (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  Within this 
categorization, a technological change can either disrupt the value of the capabilities that market 
incumbents had mastered within their value chains (i.e., competence destruction), or it can leave such 
value undisrupted and readily available for re-use (i.e., competence enhancement).  Much attention has 
been given to the former category because the prediction is then that incumbents will underperform in the 
in-house R&D of products under the new technological regime.  However, a competence-destroying 
technological change disrupts the value of the capabilities that incumbents had mastered precisely 
because it makes available a new set of capabilities with significantly improved performance within the 
steps of the value chain where they are put to use.  After all, what competence destruction implies is not 
that a capability has been lost from the value chain of an incumbent firm in the sense that the literature on 
asset erosion suggests (Dierickx and Cool, 1989).  Competence destruction does not imply a loss of 
“skill” but rather a change in the comparative value added provided by that “skill” for its owning firm.  
That is, when a competence-destroying technological change takes place, a new set of capabilities for the 
same value chain becomes available (now based on a new scientific foundation), and in comparison, the 
value added of the old capabilities is now relatively lower.  In theory, if one could price the old 
capabilities in the open market (and often managers cannot), these capabilities would now accrue a 
smaller price than they would have in the state of the world when the new capabilities did not exist yet.  
For example, consider what the value of having a manual loom is for a textile mill before and after a                                  7 
power loom is available in the strategic factor market for looms (Barney, 1986).
4  Although the manual 
loom continues to add value in the value chain of a textile mill even once a power loom is available for 
purchase, the value this manual loom adds to the textile mill is comparatively lower than what a power 
loom can now provide in terms of helping the textile mill outperform its competitors in the market for 
fabric.  Both looms remain feasible options as resources for the textile mill.  However, if the manual loom 
is significantly slower than the power loom within the mill’s value chain, and if speed is a key factor for 
the mill’s competitive performance, the “electrification” revolution (i.e., the transition from manual to 
power looms) will have imposed competence-destruction on the textile mill’s traditional value chain by 
depreciating the value that its traditional manual loom could convey for competition in the market for 
fabric. 
In other words, during a technological discontinuity, some steps of the value chain required to operate 
within the focal market are faced with more than one version of each capability available for use.  During 
the period of technological discontinuity, and until the turmoil subsides, capabilities based on the old 
technological paradigm and capabilities based on the new technological paradigm are both feasible 
options to be used by firms in competition (see Figure 1).  Which option of capabilities represents the best 
choice for each firm in competition to use in its value chain depends on the comparative strategic value 
that each capability conveys.   
 
 




I therefore propose in this paper that the analysis of the central dynamics of a competence-destroying 
technological discontinuity should center on an understanding of the available capabilities (old and new), 
their comparative value (which will factor in the cost of acquisition), and the relative access that different 
groups of firms in competition (including incumbents) have to them.   
                                                 
4 I refer to the strategic factor market as the market for looms, where the textile mill is a buyer, as opposed to the 
product market for fabric, where the textile mill is a seller.                                    8 
3.  Method 
3.1 The Setting and the Technological Discontinuity 
The setting for this case study is the market for anti-cancer drugs and its transition from cytotoxic agents 
(i.e., standard chemotherapy) to the radically new category termed targeted drugs, a transition brought 
about by the biotechnology revolution.  Studies have shown that this transition in anti-cancer drugs has 
been (and continues to be) a radical and competence-destroying change to the preclinical phase of R&D 
in this market, usually referred to as “drug discovery” (Rang, 2006; Capdeville, et al., 2002), a description 
that is consistent with that made of biotechnology’s impact at the industry level (e.g., Henderson, 
Orsenigo, and Pisano, 1999; Rothaermel, 2001).  Interview data collected support this characterization.   
As described in interview material, targeted anti-cancer drug development comprises two main variants: 
small-molecule and large-molecule drugs.  Although both variants of targeted anti-cancer drugs are 
radically different from cytotoxic drug discovery in that targeted drugs are developed through a “science-
driven” approach, among the capabilities new to incumbents, only large-molecule targeted drugs require 
the capability I refer to as “biopharmaceutical technology.”  It is within this distinction that I could 
compare two variants of a technological change with the same attributes (i.e., radical, competence-
destroying, and sustaining
5) that differ only in the access that incumbents had to one of the newly required 
capabilities. 
The capability of interest, biopharmaceutical technology, represents not one invention but a stream of 
innovations through a particular technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982).  In that sense, it represents what 
                                                 
5 A sustaining technological change is one where the dimensions of merit preferred by consumers (i.e., customer 
preferences) do not change, in contrast to disruptive technological changes where these dimensions do change 
(Christensen, 1997).  In order to isolate the dynamics of competence destruction, I need to choose a radical, 
competence-destroying change that is sustaining in customer preferences, along the lines of prior cases in the 
literature (Henderson, 1993, 1995).  According to data by the American Cancer Society (2000), the anti-cancer drug 
market was, during the years under study (i.e., up to 2004), far from satiation (i.e., far from saturation on the part of 
consumers) on the levels of efficacy and safety, the main dimensions of merit considered in an anti-cancer drug by 
consumers.  Indeed, the 5-year survival rate had changed from 50% in the years 1974-1976, to 51% in the years 
1980-1982, to 59% in the years 1989-1995, a trend that proves the market in general was far from satiation, even 
though the difference in rates between 1974-1976 and 1989-1995 is statistically significant (p<0.05).  Customer 
preferences were clearly the maximization of efficacy and safety, with ample room for improvement in those 
dimensions by any firm in competition, making this a radical change that was sustaining in customer preferences.  
Available patient accounts (e.g., Bazell, 1998) support this point as well.                                  9 
strategy researchers refer to as a first-order dynamic capability or an R&D capability (Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003).  The capability is not a single asset that is stable over time, to which firms 
would pursue access at a single point in time.  This R&D capability instead comprises a series of 
innovations that are path-dependent and whose definition is time-variant (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  
That is, the relevant innovations to which an organization required access in order to use this capability 
for the competitive advantage it conferred changed over time and therefore required sustained investment 
in it.  For example, although in the mid-1970s a high level of expertise in biopharmaceutical technology 
involved being able to re-engineer E.Coli bacteria to mass-produce a protein, by the mid-1980s a high 
level of expertise in biopharmaceutical technology required proficiency in mammalian cell culture.  
Therefore, although many firms achieved access to a one-time license on the original recombinant DNA 
technological innovation (Feldman, 2003), this step was not sufficient to have access to the full range of 
innovations and know-how that comprised the underlying dynamic capability I refer to as 
biopharmaceutical technology (see, for example, Nature, 2007, for a sub-set of innovations generated 
after the original recombinant DNA invention).   
For the empirical design of the present study, it is important not only that biopharmaceutical technology 
as a capability was dynamic (so that a single spot-transaction would not grant long-term access) and 
coincided with other newly required capabilities in entailing time compression diseconomies and low 
levels of tradeability, but also that biopharmaceutical technology had one distinctive feature that 
differentiated its origin and evolution: the increasing number of markets to which the capability became 
applicable over time (i.e., its decreasing market specificity [Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988]).   
3.2 Data Sources and Measures 
I organize the analysis in this study in two parts.  Part one is the qualitative portion, where I offer 
evidence that biopharmaceutical technology evolved with increasing market coverage and that as a result 
anti-cancer drug market incumbents were unable to recognize in time that this capability was also 
required in anti-cancer drug discovery (albeit only for the sub-set of drugs that were large-molecule).  Part 
two is the quantitative portion of the study.  I first assess the impact that the delay in start of investment in                                  10 
biopharmaceutical technology had on incumbents’ subsequent performance in this R&D capability, a 
representative case of the dynamics described by Cohen and Levinthal (1990:136) as being “locked out” 
of a technology due to late investment.  This step therefore tests the fact that this new capability had 
restricted access for anti-cancer drug market incumbents.  Indeed, it was the sub-set of diversifying 
entrants that had pioneered biopharmaceutical technology who retained leadership in the performance of 
this capability in the longer term.  As a second step, I assess the impact of the lack of access to the 
biopharmaceutical technology capability on the part of incumbents on their competitive advantage in the 
performance of drug discovery in anti-cancer drugs.  I then show that the competitive advantage in the 
capability for biopharmaceutical technology that accrued to the sub-set of diversifying entrants who 
pioneered this technology translated into a competitive advantage for these same firms in the drug 
discovery of large- but not small-molecule targeted anti-cancer drugs.  Finally, I replace the dummy 
variables identifying the different groups of firms with a direct, continuous measure of the two most 
valuable capabilities in targeted anti-cancer drug discovery: long-term oncology research, an undestroyed 
capability that being market-specific remained available only to incumbents; and expertise in 
biopharmaceutical technology, a new capability that requiring development over long time periods 
remained available only to its pioneers.  I can then show that the latter carried higher value than the 
former capability in the case of large-molecule drugs, reinforcing therefore the evidence for the 
mechanism behind the differences in R&D performance within drug discovery across the two variants of 
targeted drugs.  
I present data sources and measures for both the qualitative and quantitative parts of the study next. 
3.2.1 Qualitative Analysis   
I collected data through 45 interviews ranging between 30 and 90 minutes each, with an evolving semi-
structured interview guide.  Interviewees included R&D managers in large and small pharmaceutical 
firms (including R&D executives of three of the eight incumbent firms in the sample), industry analysts, 
and scientists both from industry and from academia.  I complemented that data with historical material 
from Walsh’s (2003) report of large-molecule drug development, customized searches in the PubMed                                  11 
database for historical background on specific drugs, and data from PJB Publications’ Pharmaprojects for 
selected information on the introduction of drugs into clinical trials.   
3.2.2 Quantitative Analysis 
For part two of the study, I looked into the possible impact of the delay of start of investment in 
biopharmaceutical technology on the performance of incumbents and different groups of entrants, both on 
their subsequent ability to innovate in this technology and on their ability to use it in anti-cancer drug 
discovery.  I explain next the sample and variables used for these purposes. 
Sample.  To construct the sample of firms, I started by identifying all anti-cancer drugs in clinical trials 
in the period 1989-2004 through PJB Publications’ database Pharmaprojects and then focused on the 
firms responsible for them.  In order to generate a sample that included firms with a clear intention to 
compete in the anti-cancer drug market, I matched the firms from Pharmaprojects to the firms reported in 
all available Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) surveys New Medicines 
in Development for Cancer (administered in 1988 and every two years from 1989 to 2003).  After 
excluding non-profit organizations, matching all cases to parent company names only, and adjusting for 
mergers and acquisitions and missing data, I identified the final sample, which comprises 165 firms 
(further details of the sampling frame is given in Sosa, 2005, 2006).   
Dependent Variables.  In order to avoid the “tautology problem,” I performed separate tests on the 
impact of differences in time of start of investment in biopharmaceutical technology, first on the long-
term performance in the capability itself, and second on the performance in the discovery of the sub-set of 
anti-cancer drugs that are large-molecule.  I explain next these two dependent variables. 
Performance in researching biopharmaceutical technology (i.e., sustained advantage in the R&D 
capability).  I estimated competence in this R&D capability by measuring over time the rate of production 
of patented innovations in this area, as reported in Thomson Scientific’s Derwent World Patent Index 
(DWPI).  This database is constructed around innovations, not patents.  Therefore, each record represents 
a unique innovation that matches to several patents, as catalogued by expert librarians.  I asked an expert 
interviewee to perform the selection of relevant codes from the DWPI catalog.  The resulting set of four                                  12 
specific DWPI manual codes paired with the 165 firms in the sample generated a dataset of 1,375 
patented innovations. Based on these data, I then analyzed the rate of production of patented innovations 
through a Cox model with repeated events following the design used previously in the management 
literature (Sørensen and Stuart, 2000).  To do this, I used the earliest date of priority filing for the patented 
innovation as the time when the event took place.  I considered the start of the time at risk for each firm’s 
first patented innovation to be either January 1
st of the first year in the dataset or of the year of founding 
for the firm, whichever was latest.  Time at risk for all subsequent cases was set to start the day 
immediately after the previous event occurrence.  To avoid selection bias, I included in the Cox 
regression all 165 firms, including those who never generated a patented innovation in biopharmaceutical 
technology (in which case, the firm’s only spell appeared as right-censored).
6   
Performance in Targeted Anti-Cancer Drug Discovery (i.e., advantage in R&D performance in one 
market: anti-cancer drugs; in the step of R&D that experienced competence destruction: drug discovery).  
In order to test for differences in competence in targeted anti-cancer drug discovery as this R&D step was 
disrupted by a competence-destroying technological change, I constructed a dependent variable that 
measured R&D performance at the stage in the value chain of a firm in this market where competence 
destruction had taken place, namely drug discovery (see Figure 2).   
 
Insert Figure 2 
 
 
I identified the set of drug molecules that each of the firms in the sample patented (a step executed 
during drug discovery, likely towards the end of this step), regardless of whether the originating firms 
decided to enter them into clinical trials or not.  To do this, I again used the DWPI database, this time 
identifying the code for anti-cancer drugs, which has been available since 1994.  Just like the patented 
innovations in biopharmaceutical technology, the patented molecules in this section are each a stand-
                                                 
6  As a robustness check I counted the total number of forward citations that the set of patents tied to each innovation 
generated.  I incorporated this measure in Cox regressions as frequency weights, that is, by duplicating records by as 
many forward citations as the patents tied to the innovation had.  This implies that this second set of regressions 
predicts the rate of production of forward citations in biopharmaceutical technology, controlling for the number of 
different patents applied for per innovation (analyses are available in Tables A.1 and A.2 in Appendix A).                                  13 
alone innovation that can correspond to an array of patents, all catalogued under the same molecule by an 
expert librarian.
7  The resulting dataset had 19,106 patented anti-cancer drug molecules, of which 9,037 
are targeted therapies (3,672 are small-molecule and 5,365 are large-molecule targeted drugs).  Just as 
with patented innovations in biopharmaceutical technology, I based the analysis on a Cox model with 
repeated events, this time setting the start at risk at the time of first entry into this market by each firm.  
Therefore, the regression evaluates the rate of production of molecules but instead of assigning a discount 
on performance due to late entry, leaves the time of entry as strategic for the firm and evaluates instead 
their sustained productivity after they finally enter (so that if a firm decides to enter late but still achieves 
high productivity, it will generate higher coefficients).   
Independent Variables.  The principal interest was to distinguish whether performance advantages 
accrued to some categories of firms in particular, and whether there was a difference between the two 
variants of the new technology that stemmed from the use of biopharmaceutical technology.  Therefore, 
the following binary variables were of primary importance. 
Small- vs. Large-Molecule Targeted Drugs.  I classified targeted anti-cancer drugs as large- vs. small-
molecule drugs through the sub-categories (e.g., interferons, interleukins) available in their classification 
within the DWPI catalogue.  The correspondence of sub-categories of technologies (e.g., interferons) to 
the appropriate broader technological variant within anti-cancer drugs (e.g., interferons corresponding to a 
type of large-molecule targeted drug) was based on the information that interviewees had provided. 
Firm Categories.  I distinguished among incumbents, diversifying and de novo entrants based on 
whether a firm had been present in the anti-cancer drug market prior to 1983 (the start of the 
biotechnology revolution in that market); in which case it was an incumbent.  In contrast, if the firm was 
not an incumbent but an entrant, I determined whether it had been operating in any market prior to its 
incursion into anti-cancer drug R&D; in which case the firm was a diversifying entrant.  If the firm had no 
organizational pre-history, it was a de novo firm.  Further details are available in Sosa (2005, 2006). 
                                                 
7  As a robustness check, I repeated analyses with a different dependent variable: advancement of drugs through 
clinical trials based on the information available in the Pharmaprojects database.  All results were qualitatively the 
same (see Appendix A, Tables A.3 – A.6).                                    14 
Biopharmaceutical Technology Pioneers.  As I will explain, the evolutionary path of biopharmaceutical 
technology did lead to differences in the timing of start of investment across firms.  Because the anti-
cancer drug market is one of the last markets to which biopharmaceutical technology (and its resulting 
large-molecule variant of drugs) became applicable, I took the date that large-molecule drugs entered 
clinical trials with a clear anti-cancer application, namely 1995 (Colwell, 2002), which coincides with the 
start of the DWPI code for anti-cancer drug molecules as well, as the cut-off date to identify 
biopharmaceutical technology pioneers.  I then used Walsh’s (2003) report to identify all large-molecule 
drugs approved up to 1994 irrespective of market application, and then combined that information with 
information from Pharmaprojects to pinpoint the developing firms for those large-molecule drugs.  I 
therefore classified as a biopharmaceutical technology pioneer a firm that had a large-molecule drug that 
(1) had been developed in-house, (2) had been approved in 1994 or before (irrespective of market 
application), and (3) was the first one in its active ingredient.
8  The identification of these 
biopharmaceutical technology pioneering firms is shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
 
This classification implies a sub-division of the larger firm categories (namely, incumbent, diversifying 
and de novo firms).  Although none of the anti-cancer market incumbents were biopharmaceutical 
technology pioneers, one of the de novo entrants and four of the diversifying entrants into the anti-cancer 
drug market were biopharmaceutical technology pioneers.  As such, in statistical analyses, I tested the 
hypothesis that biopharmaceutical technology pioneers accrued a competitive advantage in large- but not 
small-molecule anti-cancer targeted drugs through two separate tests.  The first is to replace the original 
three firm categories (i.e., incumbent, diversifying and de novo firms competing in the anti-cancer drug 
                                                 
8 Unlike small-molecule drugs, which can only reach the market with a unique active ingredient, large-molecule 
drugs that represent a protein that exists in the human body (precisely those that were launched prior to 1994) can 
reach the market even if their active ingredient is already present in another large-molecule drug available in the 
market.  This is because a protein that exists naturally in the human body cannot be patented as a molecule (i.e., 
there is no patent protection for the active ingredient).  The only patent protection available is for the manufacturing 
method for it, which remains unique even in the case of large-molecule drugs that share the same active ingredient.                                  15 
market) with four firm categories: biopharmaceutical technology pioneers, incumbents, diversifying 
entrants that are not biopharmaceutical technology pioneers, and de novo entrants that are not 
biopharmaceutical technology pioneers (see Table 2 for the intersections of these four firm categories 
with the previous three identified).  The second operationalization of the test to see if biopharmaceutical 
technology pioneers accrued an advantage in large-molecule targeted anti-cancer drugs was based on the 
two continuous measurements of their firm-level capabilities, as described next. 
 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
 
Oncology Research prior to 1983 (i.e., long-term oncology researc).  As in prior research (Sosa, 
2008a), I created the variable “oncology research prior to 1983” to equal the cumulative number of 
publications in the field of oncology as available in the Web of Science database from 1972 to 1982, a 
year before the start of the disruption that biotechnology imposes on the anti-cancer drug market. 
Capability for Biopharmaceutical Technology.  To assess the individual level of this capability that 
accrued to each firm in the sample, I generated the equivalent to fixed effects (i.e., firm-specific 
dummies) in the Cox regression assessing competitive advantage in biopharmaceutical technology (i.e., 
the analysis of the rate of production of patented innovations in biopharmaceutical technology).  I then 
used the firm-specific hazard rates from this Cox regression as an independent variable in the Cox 
regression predicting the rate of production of patented anti-cancer molecules. 
Control Variables.  In all analyses using Cox regressions, I controlled for the cumulative introduction 
of patented biopharmaceutical technology innovations or patented anti-cancer drug molecules, 
respectively.  In the analysis of patented anti-cancer drug molecules I also included “gene therapy,” a 
dummy variable singling out molecules that are gene therapy derivatives since current research has shown 
the differing level of risk in this modality separates it from the rest of biotechnology (Sosa, 2008b). 
4. Analysis and Results 
4.1 The Origin and Evolution of Biopharmaceutical Technology                                  16 
According to interviewees and the supporting archival sources abovementioned, biopharmaceutical 
technology has made possible the mass-production of one variant of biotechnology-based drugs: large-
molecule drugs.  Interviewees consistently reported that biopharmaceutical technology not only made 
large-molecule drugs economically available for the first time but also, as I explain next, that their 
evolution advanced through three stages with increasing market coverage.  Indeed, in a recent article in 
the natural sciences, Leader, Baca and Golan (2008) argue for the distinction of these three classes.
9 
Biopharmaceutical technology was first developed to mass-produce proteins (i.e., large-molecule drugs) 
that not only occurred naturally in the human body but also whose use in disease treatment had already 
been established.  Indeed, the first applications of large-molecule drugs spanned only diseases that 
represented protein deficiencies.  This set of diseases comprises stage I in the evolution of the market 
specificity of biopharmaceutical technology.   
A representative case in the application of biopharmaceutical technology during stage I of its evolution 
is that of insulin.  Insulin’s principal therapeutic value is the treatment of diabetes mellitus, a disease in 
which patients lack natural insulin production and where artificially supplying the protein restores health 
to the patient.  The enzyme has been researched under the name “insulin” since at least 1909, and by 1922 
researchers at the University of Toronto had isolated the enzyme and proved its effectiveness in 
regulating sugar metabolism (Rosenfeld, 2002).  By 1976 when Genentech successfully applied for the 
first time biopharmaceutical technology to the production of a drug (to be commercialized by Eli Lilly 
and Co. [Christensen, 1996]), the enzyme had been in commercial production by semi-synthetic processes 
since 1923 (when Eli Lilly and Co. achieved successful yield and standardization of the first mass-
production method).  By 1976 therefore, both the molecule for insulin and its therapeutic connection to 
diabetes mellitus were public knowledge. 
It was not until later, as biopharmaceutical technology evolved, that other known proteins for which no 
connection to disease treatment was known began to be researched in-depth.  This then is stage II of the 
                                                 
9 The authors propose an additional fourth class for the use of large-molecule drugs in diagnostics, but this 
application falls out of the scope of the current paper.                                  17 
evolution of biopharmaceutical technology’s market coverage.  A case in point is that of erythropoietin, 
commonly referred to as Epo, a protein today commercially available as Amgen’s best-selling large-
molecule drug for anemia treatment, Epogen®.  According to scientist J.W. Fisher’s (1998) own account 
of his and others’ breakthrough research in “the quest for erythropoietin,” one of the most important 
academic papers confirming the existence of Epo was published in 1950; however,  
“until the gene for Epo was cloned by Lin et al. [1985] at Amgen and Jacobs et al. [1985], Epo 
was [erroneously] thought to be produced in the glomerular epithelial cells.  The ability to 
clone made it possible [to determine Epo’s appropriate source and therapeutic value]” (p. 10). 
As biopharmaceutical technology developed, the therapeutic potential of large-molecule drugs grew in 
relevance.  Ultimately a class of large-molecule drugs of laboratory-based design emerged.  This new 
product class comprises stage III in the evolution of this R&D capability’s market coverage.  This stage 
includes markets with higher profitability prospects (e.g., anti-cancer drugs).  An example is Herceptin®, 
the new targeted anti-cancer large-molecule drug designed by Genentech that targets Her2-expressing 
breast cancers (Bazell, 1998). 
Interviewees coincided in their descriptions of the historical progression of the R&D of large-molecule 
drugs in the three stages described above: (I) a class of known proteins with known connections to disease 
treatment (e.g., insulin); (II) a class of known proteins with unknown connections to disease treatment 
(e.g., Epo); and (III) a newly born class of engineered proteins (e.g., Herceptin®).    Therefore, sub-types 
of large-molecule drugs available in the market can be classified into the three sub-classes defined by the 
three stages of evolution of biopharmaceutical technology (see Table 3).  For illustration purposes I 
constructed Figure 3 (below) based on these three sub-classes and the list of all large-molecule drugs 
(irrespective of indication) approved in the USA up to 2003 as reported in Walsh (2003).     
 
 





Insert Figure 3 
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Because each disease treatment is, in rough terms, a stand-alone market,
10 what this progression of 
applicability to ever more diseases represents for biopharmaceutical technology as a capability is an 
expansion on market coverage (see Figure 4).  This temporal difference in market coverage (or its 
opposite index, market specificity) led to temporal differences in the start of investment in 
biopharmaceutical technology for some firms, among them, precisely the eight firms that constituted the 
group of incumbents in the largest market within pharmaceuticals: anti-cancer drugs. 
Indeed, anti-cancer drug market incumbents have publicly declared their delay in investment to be a 
result of excess technological uncertainty, as then-president for international R&D at Hoffmann-La Roche 
publicly explained: 
“At first, the pharmaceutical industry was slow to react to the challenge.  Many companies 
regarded [biopharmaceutical technology] as an esoteric science with little promise for 
substantial economic returns … .  This initial promise has since been convincingly redeemed 
…” Drews (1993: S16). 
In fact, later expansion into markets with intense use of biopharmaceutical technology has prompted 
some of the anti-cancer drug market incumbents to resort to the acquisition of drugs, precisely because 
the acquisition of the capability itself is not an option (i.e., there is no access to the capability).  For 
example, whereas according to Pharmaprojects, the anti-cancer drug market incumbent Bristol-Myers 
Squibb (BMS) did not have internally developed AIDS-treatment drugs that reached clinical trials in the 
period 1989-2004, the firm is currently a leader in sales in the AIDS-treatment market.  All their 
successful AIDS-treatment drugs are acquisitions: Reyataz® acquired from Novartis, Videx® acquired 
from the National Institutes of Health, and Zerit® acquired in early stages from Yale University.  In a 
non-confidential interview in March 2007, an R&D executive for BMS explained their complex pattern of 
decisions: whereas BMS did invest early in the application-specific side (i.e., the part considered 
oncology research [Sosa, 2008a]) of large-molecule anti-cancer drug development (mainly through 
                                                 
10 Cancer and many therapeutic areas comply not only with the basic definition of a market (i.e., a set of products 
that are substitutes for one another) but also with the additional requirements discussed in the economics literature 
for high-tech settings (Sutton, 1998).                                  19 
investment in the Lewis-Y mechanism of action to target cancer treatment), they did fall behind in 
biopharmaceutical technology (a nonmarket-specific technological platform that was not applicable to 
cancer during its early stages). 
4.2 The Impact of Differences in Time of Start of Investment in Biopharmaceutical Technology on 
Long-Term Performance in this Capability 
The increase over time in the number of markets in which biopharmaceutical technology was applicable 
generated heterogeneity in the timing of start of investment in this technological capability.  This then led 
to differences in the competence to further research biopharmaceutical technology.  The hypothesis tested 
in this section is therefore whether biopharmaceutical technology pioneers had a sustained advantage in 
the competence to further research biopharmaceutical technology over time.  Table 4 offers descriptive 
statistics, and Table 5 offers the Cox model results for regressions predicting the rate of production of 
patented innovations in the biopharmaceutical technology area in the period 1979-2004.   
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The baseline (omitted category) in models 1 and 2 is entrants and diversifying entrants, respectively.  In 
model 1, incumbents have a clear advantage over all entrants.  Model 2 then shows that this advantage is 
driven by de novo firms having a disadvantage, with the mean performance of incumbents and all 
diversifying entrants being equal.   In model 3, the baseline (omitted category) is now diversifying 
entrants that are not biopharmaceutical technology pioneers.  In this model, de novo firms that are not 
biopharmaceutical technology pioneers are the lowest ranking group in competition, with a statistically 
significant disadvantage (their hazard rate is < 1 and significant).  The group of diversifying entrants now 
sub-divides into a group out-performing incumbents and another under-performing them: 
biopharmaceutical technology pioneers outperform incumbents (the test for equality of coefficients is                                  20 
rejected at p < 0.00001), whereas diversifying entrants that are not biopharmaceutical technology pioneers 
underperform incumbents (where the former are the baseline and the latter are statistically significantly > 
1 with a hazard rate of 1.5).  This analysis implies that pioneers in the area of biopharmaceutical 
technology accrued an advantage in this R&D capability that persisted until at least 2004, the year 
observation ended.   
4.3 The Impact of Heterogeneity in the Capability for Biopharmaceutical Technology on 
Performance in the R&D of Anti-Cancer Drugs 
So far, I have offered evidence supporting the result that the origin and evolution of biopharmaceutical 
technology with its gradual increase in market coverage translated into differences in time of start of 
investment in this technological capability across firms in competition.  This delay in start of investment 
in biopharmaceutical technology turned into a persistent difficulty in access for many firms in 
competition, including incumbents, as they tried to catch up but failed to achieve leadership in this 
capability’s expertise.  In this section, I present evidence that the sustained advantage in the research of 
biopharmaceutical technology resulted in an advantage in the execution of drug discovery of large-
molecule targeted anti-cancer drugs for the firms who pioneered the technology, leaving incumbents in 
2
nd place.  Furthermore, although long-term oncology research is a capability conferring strategic value to 
incumbents in both variants of the new technology (i.e., small- and large-molecule targeted anti-cancer 
drugs), the newly required capability of biopharmaceutical technology had comparatively higher strategic 
value in the one variant of the new technology that required it (namely large-molecule targeted anti-
cancer drugs).  Therefore, in this section I show that in the particular case of large-molecule targeted anti-
cancer drug discovery, although long-term oncology research still provided significant strategic value to 
incumbents, that source of competitive advantage fell behind biopharmaceutical technology in strategic 
value.  As a consequence, although incumbents led in the execution of small-molecule targeted anti-
cancer drug discovery thanks to their re-usable long-term oncology research, these firms fell behind those 
few entrants who had pioneered biopharmaceutical technology in the case of large-molecule targeted anti-
cancer drug discovery.                                   21 
To show these dynamics I use Cox regressions predicting the rate of production of patented anti-cancer 
drug molecules.  Table 6 presents descriptive statistics, whereas Table 7 presents analyses.       
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In the comparison of Table 7 models 1 and 2, the key dynamics are present: incumbents lead in small-
molecule targeted anti-cancer drug discovery (their hazard rate is significantly > 1 and significantly 
higher than that of biopharmaceutical technology pioneers) but follow second in the case of the large-
molecule counterparts (incumbents’ hazard rate is still significantly > 1 but this time significantly lower 
than biopharmaceutical technology pioneers’ hazard rate).
11  In Table 7 model 3, I replace the use of 
binary variables that identify the specific firm categories in competition with a continuous proxy for the 
underlying capabilities present in these firm categories.  As can be seen, both capabilities enhance 
performance (both have hazard rates significantly > 1), but the capability for biopharmaceutical 
technology has higher comparative value than long-term oncology research in this variant of products (the 
test of equality of coefficients is rejected at p < 0.00001). 
5.  Discussion 
I started this paper with the proposition that the assessment of the extent of competence destruction is 
necessary but not sufficient for the analysis of competitive dynamics through a technological 
discontinuity.  An assessment of the comparative strategic value (i.e., the comparative value added and 
ease of access) of the new capabilities, with respect to one another and to old capabilities, is necessary 
too.  Indeed recent research has shown that managers can separately identify the effect of competence-
destruction/enhancement from that of competence acquisition for the innovations involved in the markets 
in which their firms compete (Gatignon, Tushman, Smith and Anderson, 2002).  With the evaluation of 
the comparative strategic value of different capabilities (old and new) in mind, the analyst can determine 
                                                 
11  Results are qualitatively equal if a Negative Binomial, as a cross-sectional count-model specification, is used.                                  22 
how ownership of (and access to) these capabilities is heterogeneously distributed across the different 
groups of firms in competition and conclude which firms will accrue a competitive advantage over others. 
I tested and found evidence for the proposition in this paper by looking at the transition from cytotoxic 
to targeted drug discovery in the market for anti-cancer drugs, a transition that is competence-destroying 
to the drug discovery steps of incumbents’ standing value chains.  Within targeted drugs, I differentiated 
between two technological variants, small- and large-molecule drugs, which differ, not in their level of 
competence-destruction vs. cytotoxic drug discovery, but in the characteristics of the new capabilities 
they required.  In particular, large-molecule drug discovery required one more capability, namely 
biopharmaceutical technology, than small-molecule drug discovery.  I then looked at the origin and 
evolution of this new capability, and the unfolding timing of start of investment of different groups of 
firms that ultimately competed in the anti-cancer drug market.  In so doing, I was able to show that 
biopharmaceutical technology was harder to access later on than other new capabilities, precisely because 
its origin and evolution gave rise to a “resource position barrier” (Wernerfelt, 1984: 173) that favored 
pioneering firms.
12  That is, this is a first mover advantage into a capability, not a first mover advantage 
into a market.  I was also able to show that biopharmaceutical technology had higher comparative value-
added than the only old capability that incumbents could retain due to its market-specificity: long-term 
oncology research (Sosa, 2008a).  As a consequence, within the anti-cancer drug market incumbents 
retained the lead in the drug discovery of small-molecule targeted drugs, but fell behind 
biopharmaceutical technology pioneers in large-molecule counterparts. 
Beyond fulfilling this study’s initial objective, the unique case presented offers further contributions to 
both the literature on creative destruction and, more broadly, research in strategy formulation for markets 
with rapid technological change.  Within the literature on creative destruction, I show how incumbents 
delayed their investment in the new technology even though the change was sustaining in customer 
preferences.  That is, the determinant of late investment among incumbents was not an unforeseen change 
                                                 
12 Classic studies of the effect of timing of entry on competitive advantage (e.g., Mitchell, 1991; Lieberman and 
Montgomery, 1988) examine the order of entry into a product market (therefore investigating the emergence of 
market entry barriers).  In contrast, the current study examines the order of start of investment in an R&D capability 
useful to compete in one or more markets (therefore investigating the emergence of resource position barriers).                                      23 
in customer preferences as prior research has suggested (Christensen, 1997).  It was rather an unforeseen 
change in the market-specificity of a technological capability generated within the new technological 
paradigm.  This result implies that attention should be centered not only on whether a change is sustaining 
in customer preferences, given that the case in this paper shows there is a second mechanism that could 
generate uncertainty leading to delayed investment.  Rather, attention should be centered on the varied 
sources of uncertainty arising during a technological discontinuity and whether the monitoring system 
that incumbents possess can adequately circumvent them, which is in line with current research in the 
impact of information infrastructure on firms’ strategic decisions (Williams and Mitchell, 2004).  
Within the literature on strategy formulation for markets with rapid technological change, this study 
elaborates on the current interest in the origin and evolution of capabilities (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; 
Ahuja and Katila, 2004; Ethiraj et al., 2005).  In contrast to prior studies, I am able to identify both the 
origin and evolution of a capability to show how during a transition from one technological regime to 
another these characteristics of a capability had an impact on heterogeneity in R&D performance.   
Lastly, in this case the same capability (long-term oncology research), although conveying the same 
absolute value, became a definite source of competitive advantage in one variant of products, and fell 
behind another capability in a second variant, through a technological discontinuity.  This is the case 
because the strategic value of capabilities through a discontinuity is measured in relative terms, always in 
comparison to other capabilities required.  Future research will be needed to further develop our 
understanding of how firms might evaluate the comparative strategic value of the different capabilities in 
their choice set. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Pre-1995 USA Approvals of Large-Molecule Drugs, their Application and Developing Firms 
 
Year*  Brand 
Name* 










1982  Humulin  Insulin  Diabetes  
mellitus  Eli Lilly  Genentech  9 
1985  Protropin 
Human growth  
hormone (hGH)     
hGH deficiency in 
children  Genentech Genentech  9 
1986  Intron A  Interferon alpha 2  Cancer, genital warts, 
hepatitis  Schering Plough  Biogen  9 
1986  Roferon A  Interferon alpha 2  Hairy cell  
leukemia  Hoffman-La Roche  Genentech  9 
1986  Recombivax 
Hepatitis B virus 
surface antigen  Hepatitis B vaccine  Merck    
1986  Orthoclone 
OKT3 
Muromomab CD3 
Reversal of acute 
kidney transplant  
rejection 
Ortho Biotech  
(Johnson & Johnson) 









myocardial infarction  Genentech Genentech  9 
1987  Humatrope  hGH  hGH deficiency in 
children  Eli Lilly  Eli Lilly   
1989  Epogen  Epoetin alpha  Anemia  Amgen Amgen  9 
1990  Procrit  Epoetin alpha  Cancer-related anemia  Ortho Biotech    
(Johnson & Johnson)  Amgen  
1990  Actimmune 
Interferon  gamma 
1 
Chronic  
granulomatous disease  Genentech Genentech  9 
1991  Novolin  Insulin  Diabetes  
mellitus  Novo Nordisk  Novo Nordisk   






Autologous bone  
marrow transplantation 
Amgen and Schering 
AG  Immunex  9 
1991  Neupogen  Filgrastim  Chemotherapy-induced  
neutropenia  Amgen Amgen  9 
1992  Recombinate  Factor VIII  Hemophilia A  Baxter / Wyeth  Genetics Institute  9 
1992  Proleukin  Interleukin 2  Renal cell  
carcinoma  Chiron Chiron  9 





colorectal and ovarian  
cancers 
Cytogen Cytogen   
1993  Bioclate  Factor VIII  Hemophilia A  Centeon Genetics  Institute   
1993  Kogenate 
Factor VIII, 2
nd 
generation  Hemophilia A  Bayer Bayer   
1993  Betaseron  Interferon beta 1  Relapsing  multiple  
sclerosis 
Berlex laboratories and 
Chiron  Chiron  9 
1993  Pulmozyme  Dornase alpha  Cystic fibrosis  Genentech Genentech  9 




hGH deficiency in 
children  Genentech Genentech   
1994  ReoPro  Abciximab  Prevention of blood 
clots  Centocor  State University, 
NY   
1994  Cerezyme 
Beta 
glucocerebrosidase  Gaucher’s disease  Genzyme Genzyme  9 
 
Sources: 
  *   Walsh (2003) 
 **  Pharmaprojects 
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Table 2 
Sub-Division of the Three Firm Categories (Incumbents, Diversifying and De Novo Entrants) into 



























Biopharmaceutical technology pioneers 
Incumbents 
Diversifying entrants that are not biopharmaceutical technology pioneers 
De novo entrants that are not biopharmaceutical technology pioneers                                  28 
 
Table 3 
Evolution of Biopharmaceutical Technology 
 
(3a) Different indications (i.e., product markets) to which biopharmaceutical technology 
was applicable in each stage of this capability’s chronological evolution. 
 
Stage I  
protein and connection to 
disease known 
Stage II 
only protein known 
Stage III 
new product class 
Insulin Epo 
Factor VIII  Interferons 








(3b) Visual representation of the increase in market coverage of the capability for 
biopharmaceutical technology as time progressed in three discrete stages in the history of the 
evolution of the underlying technology (adapted from Wernerfelt, 1984). 
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Table 4 
Competence in Biopharmaceutical Technology 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for  
Analysis of Rate of Production of Patented Innovations 
(1,540 Spells, 1,375 Events) 
 
 Count  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min.  Max. 
(1) Incumbent  329         
(2) De Novo  252         
(3) Biopharmaceutical 
Technology Pioneer  450        
(4) De Novo, no Pioneer  245         
(5) Cumulative    319  247  0  846 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Incumbent  1         
(2) De Novo  -0.25  1       
(3) Biopharmaceutical 
Technology Pioneer  -0.36 -0.28  1     
(4) De Novo, no Pioneer  -0.24  0.98  -0.30  1   
(4) Cumulative  -0.34  -0.37  0.15  -0.36  1 
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Table 5 
Cox Model Analysis of  
Rate of Production of Patented Innovations in Biopharmaceutical Technology 
(1,540 Spells, 1,375 Events) 
All Coefficients in Hazard Rates 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   







De Novo   0.27*** 
(0.02) 
  
Biopharmaceutical Pioneer     2.13*** 
(0.16) 
 
De Novo, no Pioneer     0.40*** 
(0.03) 
 







Log Likelihood  -8,992  -8,846  -8,796   
+ p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001   
Standard errors in parentheses.   
 
≠ coefficients 
p < 0.00001                                  31 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for  
Analyses of Rate of Production of Patented Drug Molecules (Drug Discovery) 
 
Small-Molecule Targeted Anti-Cancer Drugs 
 
  count  mean  std.dev.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
(1)  Incumbent  1,360     1          
(2)  Diversifying  1,780      -0.73  1          
(3)  De  Novo  578      -0.33  -0.41  1         
(4)  Biopharmaceutical  Pioneer  260      -0.21  0.24  -0.05  1        
(5) De Novo, no Pioneer  556      -0.32  -0.40  0.98  -0.12  1           
(6)  Cumulative    68.1  68.3  0.34  -0.10 -0.31 -0.16 -0.30  1         
(7) Cumulative X Incumbent        0.73  -0.53  -0.24  -0.15  -0.23  0.69  1       
(8) Cumulative X De Novo        -0.15  -0.20  0.47  -0.04  0.47  0.02  -0.11  1     
(9) Cumulative X 
Biopharmaceutical Pioneer        -0.17  0.21 -0.08 0.79 -0.09 -0.08 -0.12 -0.04  1   
(10) Cumulative X De Novo, 
no Pioneer        -0.15 -0.19 0.46 -0.06 0.48 0.02 -0.11 0.99 -0.04  1 
 
 
Large-Molecule Targeted Anti-Cancer Drugs 
 
  count  mean  std.dev.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 
(1)  Incumbent  1,066     1           
(2)  Diversifying  3,278      -0.62  1           
(3)  De  Novo  1,055      -0.24  -0.61  1          
(4)  Biopharmaceutical  Pioneer  1,879      -0.36  0.53  -0.29  1         
(5) De Novo, no Pioneer  988      -0.23  -0.59  0.96  -0.35  1             
(6)  Cumulative    265.1 372.1 -0.20 0.41 -0.30 0.63 -0.29  1           
(7)  Cumulative  X  Incumbent    22.7  62.2  0.74  -0.45 -0.18 -0.27 -0.17 -0.07  1         
(8) Cumulative X De Novo    7.5  25.6  -0.15  -0.36  0.59  -0.18  0.58  -0.13  -0.11  1       
(9) Cumulative X 
Biopharmaceutical Pioneer    203.3 393.0 -0.26 0.41 -0.25 0.71 -0.25 0.97 -0.19 -0.15  1     
(10) Cumulative X De Novo, 
no Pioneer    7.1  25.4  -0.14 -0.35 0.56 -0.20 0.59 -0.13 -0.10 0.99 -0.14  1   




Cox Model Analysis of Rate of Production  
of Patented Molecules  
All Coefficients in Hazard Rates 
All Analyses estimated with Robust Standard Errors 
 
    Only Small 
Targeted 
Only Large  
Targeted 
 
    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3   




(0.99)     
De Novo            
Biopharmaceutical 
Pioneer 
  0.80 
(0.22) 
  5.43** 
(2.92)     
De Novo, no Pioneer    0.29*** 
(0.06) 
  0.35** 
(0.11)     
Cumulative    1.01*** 
(0.00) 







  0.99** 
(0.00) 
  1.00 




  1.02** 
(0.01) 
  1.00*** 
(0.00)     
Cumulative X De 
Novo, no Pioneer 
  1.02*** 
(0.00) 
  1.02*** 
(0.00)     
Gene Therapy        1.80** 
(0.31)     
Oncology Research 
prior to 1983 






        13.29*** 
(7.46) 
 
Spells    3,718    5,399 5,399   
Events    3,672    5,365 5,365   
Log Likelihood    -14,235    -19,035 -20,616   
+ p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 






p < 0.00001 
≠ coeff 
p < 0.00001 
one-way test 
of coeff’s 




A Dynamic View of the Resource-Based View of the Firm 
(adapted from Wernerfelt, 1984:179) 
 
(1a). The Original, Static Representation of the Resource Base View of the Firm  
 
  Market A  Market B  Market C 
Resource 1  V1A    V1C 
Resource 2  V2A  V2B  V2C 
Resource 3  V3A    
 
 
(1b). A Dynamic Representation of the Resource-Based View of the Firm 
 
Resource-Market Matrix at t = t0  
State of Market A before the Transition to the New 
Technological Paradigm of Resource 1 started 
 
  Market A  Market B  Market C 
Resource 1  V1A    
Resource 2  V2A  V2B  V2C 
Resource 3  V3A    V3C 
 
 
Resource-Market Matrix at t = t1  
Period of Transition of Market A, through the Technological 
Discontinuity in Resource 1 
 
  Market A  Market B  Market C 
Resource 1 
(* indicates the new 
technological paradigm) 
V1A  or V1*A 
where V1*A  > V1A 
  
Resource 2  V2A  V2B  V2C 
Resource 3  V3A    V3C 
 
 
Resource-Market Matrix at t = t2  
New State of Market A, after the Transition to the New 
Technological Paradigm for Resource 1 has ended 
 
  Market A  Market B  Market C 
Resource 1 
(* indicates the new 
technological paradigm) 
V1*A    
Resource 2  V2A  V2B  V2C 
Resource 3  V3A    V3C                                  34 
Figure 2 
Typical Value Chain in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Adapted from Fig. 4.1 (p.44) in Rang (2006) 
 
R&D Process 




















New Drug (IND) 
New Drug       
Application 
(NDA)                                  35 
 
Figure 3 
The Unfolding Three Groups of Large-Molecule Drugs in the Biotechnology Revolution Resulting 
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